The Libyan Crisis: Political and Institutional Fragmentation, External Interventions, and Obstacles to National Reconciliation (2014–2026)

Abstract

This study examines how political and institutional fragmentation interacts with competition over public resources and external involvement to prolong the Libyan crisis between 2014 and 2026, while treating the developments of 2011 as essential background. It asks why political settlements and national elections have repeatedly stalled despite numerous domestic and international initiatives. Using a qualitative descriptive and historical approach, the study analyses the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, the 2020 ceasefire agreement, UN reports, economic assessments and human rights documentation. It distinguishes political commitments from implementation and measurable effects. The evidence indicates that competing claims to legitimacy, fragmented security authority, rent-dependent institutions and contested electoral guarantees reinforce one another. External actors shape domestic incentives, but their involvement alone does not account for the persistence of the crisis. The study proposes a gradual approach linking an agreed electoral framework to financial and security institutional reform, transitional justice and safeguards for civic participation. Its conclusions are documentary and analytical rather than the results of fieldwork or independent causal measurement.